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A NORMATIVE THEORY OF THE
CLEAN HANDS DEFENSE
Ori J. Herstein*
Cornell University Law School
What is the clean hands defense (CHD) normatively about? Courts designate court
integrity as the CHD’s primary norm. Yet, while the CHD may at times further court
integrity, it is not fully aligned with court integrity. In addition to occasionally instru-
mentally furthering certain goods (e.g., court legitimacy, judge integrity, deterrence),
the CHD embodies two judicially undetected norms: retribution and tu quoque (“you
too!”). Tu quoque captures the moral intuition that wrongdoers are in no position to
blame, condemn, or make claims on others who are guilty of similar or related
wrongdoing. The CHD shares the structure of the tu quoque: both are doctrines of
standing that deflate the illocutionary force (and not the truth-value) of normative
speech acts directed against wrongdoers by those guilty of similar or connected
wrongdoing. The CHD also exhibits retributive logic: it sanctions plaintiffs by reason
of their wrongdoing and manifests the retributive principle that “punishment must fit
the crime.”
I. INTRODUCTION
Given its natural-law “feel” and its moralistic tenor, it is surprising that the
clean hands defense (CHD) has attracted so little jurisprudential reflection.
The formulation of the clean hands maxim is well-known: “He who comes
into equity must come with clean hands.”1 Yet this language offers little
insight into the normativity of the CHD. What is the CHD normatively for
or about? More specifically, what values and which norms does the CHD
embody or saliently further? What is the moral force of these values and
norms? Is the CHD justified? These are the questions this article addresses.
A normative theory of the CHD is especially desirable considering that
in the law, denying the right to be heard is an anomalous response to
wrongdoing. The law generally does not deny access to established legal
∗For helpful notes and comments on previous drafts I am grateful to Gregg Alexander, Keren
Azulay, Sherry F. Colb, Michael C. Dorf, David Enoch, Anna Finkelstern, Israel Gilead, Miguel
Herstein, Robert Hillman, Jens Ohlin, Re’em Segev, Emily L. Sherwin, Laura Underkuffler,
Bradley Wendel, Eyal Zamir, the referees for LEGAL THEORY, and the participants of the 2011
Hebrew University Law and Philosophy Workshop. I am also grateful to Cornell research
librarian Iantha M. Haight for her assistance.
1. See, e.g., Johnson v. Yellow Cab Transit Co., 321 U.S. 383, 387 (1944); DAN B. DOBBS,
LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES, EQUITY, RESTITUTION 68 (2d ed. 1993).
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recourse to a victim of legally recognized wrongdoing even if the victim’s
past is marred with moral, legal, or ethical blemishes. The fate of legal claims
is determined and assessed based mostly on their substantive and procedural
merits, not on the morality, ethics, or legality of the plaintiff’s past actions,
where such actions neither impinge on evidentiary issues (such as witness
credibility) nor are among the operative or material facts on which the legal
merits of the claim turn. In dealing with or in responding to wrongdoing,
the law mostly imposes liability (such as in torts), obligations (such as in
contract law), or punishment (such as in criminal law). Why, therefore,
in cases of unclean hands do plaintiffs’ wrongful actions, which are not
material to the merits of their legal action, ground the loss of access to
legal remedy? How does past wrongdoing by the plaintiff—if connected or
similar to the substance of her claim—justify her losing her claim regardless
of the claim’s legal merits?
Following a doctrinal introduction of the CHD (Section II), the article
turns to a critical assessment of the practically unanimous answer the vast
majority of U.S. judicial authorities have given to the questions presented
above (Section III). As is demonstrated below, courts are overwhelmingly
of the opinion that the CHD is primarily a doctrine of court integrity. This
article develops and explores this position, arguing that it is at best only
partially correct.
Upon pointing out the descriptive as well as the prescriptive merits and
limitations of the court-integrity account, the article turns to what are two
largely undetected key norms I believe the CHD embodies the tu quoque
(“you too!” or “you also”) and retribution. The norm of tu quoque captures
the widely held conviction that those guilty of wrongdoing are in no po-
sition to condemn, judge, criticize, blame, or make claims on others for
performing similar or related wrongs. Demonstrating that the CHD and
the tu quoque share the same logic and structure, the article argues that the
CHD is a legal manifestation of the tu quoque. Accordingly, the CHD is best
characterized as a doctrine of standing (Section IV).
The article argues next, in direct contradiction to what many courts
explicitly stipulate, that the CHD is a punitive doctrine with retributive
properties (Section V). The article’s final section on the norms relevant to
the CHD considers a handful of public-policy considerations in favor of the
CHD (Section VI). Tying these various threads together, the article offers
an account of the CHD’s normative structure and of the various norms and
values comprising what the CHD is normatively for as well as a recap of what
these norms and values have going for them from a moral point of view
(Section VII).
The article closes with an explanation of how the norms that comprise
what the CHD is normatively for give reasons for the CHD as well as perhaps
forming a prima facie justification for the defense (Section VIII).
The article mostly refers to the “clean hands defense,” yet it is worth noting
that the same doctrine is often referred to as the “unclean hands defense.”
For reasons of consistency I use primarily the former formulation.
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II. THE DOCTRINE OF THE CLEAN HANDS DEFENSE
The CHD manifests the principle that “one cannot seek equitable relief or
assert an equitable defense if that party has violated an equitable principle,
such as good faith.”2 Any willful conduct that is iniquitous, unfair, dishon-
est, fraudulent, unconscionable, or performed in bad faith may constitute
“unclean hands” under the CHD.3 Conduct in violation of the CHD need
not therefore be illegal.4 A party seeking to obtain an equitable remedy
may be denied on the grounds of unclean hands if her conduct violated
principles of law, ethics, equity, or morality, even though the claimant would
have been entitled to the remedy absent her prior wrongdoing.5
A component of the CHD common to most of its manifestations is that the
plaintiff’s iniquitous or wrongful conduct—grounding the rejection of his or
her complaint or petition—must somehow connect or relate to the conduct,
interaction, or transaction underlying the plaintiff’s cause of action.6 While
“equity does not demand that its suitors shall have led blameless lives . . . it
does require that they shall have acted fairly and without fraud or deceit as
to the controversy in issue.”7
There are different views as to what constitutes “connectedness” or “relat-
edness” between a plaintiff’s iniquity or wrongful conduct and the subject
matter of her suit, petition, or complaint.8 While some courts require that
the wrongdoing directly relate to the right or legal question that is in dis-
pute, other courts mandate only that the wrongdoing was committed as
part of the interaction or transaction that underlies the suit.9 What is clear
is that where a plaintiff’s wrongdoing is collateral to the subject matter of
2. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 268 (8th ed. 2004).
3. See Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 815 (1945);
N.Y. Football Giants, Inc. v. L.A. Chargers Football Club, Inc., 291 F.2d 471, 473 (5th Cir. 1961);
DOBBS, supra note 1, at 68; 27A AM. JUR. 2D Equity §100 (1996).
4. Precision, supra note 3, at 815; DOBBS, supra note 1, at 68.
5. See Deweese v. Reinhard, 165 U.S. 386, 390 (1897) (“if the conduct of the plaintiff
be offensive to the dictates of natural justice, then, whatever may be the rights he possesses
and whatever use he may make of them in a court of law, he will be held remediless in a
court of equity.”); Miller v. Beneficial Mgmt. Corp., 855 F. Supp. 691, 712–713 (D.N.J. 1994)
(“Whenever a party who seeks to set the judicial machinery in motion and obtain some
equitable remedy has violated conscience or good faith, or other equitable principle in his
prior conduct with reference to the subject in issue, the doors of equity will be shut against him
[or her] notwithstanding the defendant’s conduct has been such that in the absence of the
circumstances supporting the maxim, equity might have awarded relief.”) (citations omitted).
6. Garber v. Crews, 324 U.S. 200 (1945); Loughran v. Loughran, 292 U.S. 216, 229 (1934)
(J. Brandeis); Keystone Driller Co. v. Gen. Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240, 245 (1933); Fladeboe
v. Am. Isuzu Motors, Inc., 150 Cal. App. 4th 42, 57 (4th Dist. 2007), modified, (Apr. 24, 2007);
Mas v. Coca-Cola Co., 163 F.2d 505, 508 (4th Cir. 1947); Hoehm v. Crews, 144 F.2d 665, 672
(10th Cir. 1944); Ohio Oil Co. v. Sharp, 135 F.2d 303, 307 (10th Cir. Okla. 1943); Salzman v.
Bachrach, 996 P.2d 1263, 1265 (Colo. 2000); Nakahara v. NS 1991 Am. Trust, 718 A.2d 518, 522
(Del. Ch. 1998); CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§2946 (2d ed. 2010); 27A AM. JUR., supra note 3, §104; DOBBS, supra note 1, at 68–70. KENNETH
H. YORK, JOHN A. BAUMAN & DOUG RENDLEMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON REMEDIES 209 (5th ed.
1992).
7. Precision, supra note 3, at 814 (emphasis added).
8. DOBBS, supra note 1, at 70.
9. JAMES M. FISCHER, UNDERSTANDING REMEDIES 463–464 (2006).
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her suit, her wrongful conduct is not sufficiently connected or related to
the litigation so as to give rise to a defense of unclean hands.10
Before delving into the philosophical analysis, here is a couple of illustrat-
ing examples. As a way of preventing debtors seizing his assets, Plaintiff Os-
borne, the owner of a paving business, contracted with defendant Nottley’s
husband (later deceased) to hold, in exchange for certain consideration,
title of a parcel of land, a mobile home, and stock in the paving business all
owned by Osborne.11 The parties agreed that once Osborne’s “problems”
or “issues” with his creditors were resolved, Nottley would return title to Os-
borne. Not surprisingly perhaps, once Osborne settled his affairs, Nottley
refused to transfer the assets back to Osborne. Osborne ejected the defen-
dant from the properties, and litigation ensued. Plaintiff Osborne sought
equitable relief in the form of a declaration of ownership. The Oregon
Court of Appeals barred relief on the ground of unclean hands, ruling that
“[a] conveyance designed ‘for the purpose of placing property beyond the
reach of creditors’ constitutes inequitable conduct sufficient to bar relief
under the unclean hands doctrine.”12
A second example is that of Nakahara v. The NS 1991 American Trust, in
which, sued for fraud, plaintiff-trustees sought advancement of indemnifi-
cation from the trust for their litigation costs.13 The defendant denied that
the plaintiffs were entitled to the advance. Although the Delaware Court of
Chancery determined that the law allowed for the sought-after advances, the
plaintiffs’ motion was denied on the grounds of their unclean hands. Prior
to reaching the Chancery Court, the matter of advancement was brought
before a foreign jurisdiction that ruled, on ground of forum non conveniens,
that the matter was better adjudicated in Delaware. Their anticipation of
further litigation in Delaware notwithstanding, the plaintiffs unilaterally
advanced themselves large sums of money from the trust. Moreover, the
plaintiffs timed their terminating of an agreement with the defendant to
assure effectively that the defendant would not learn of the advance until
10. RENDLEMAN ET AL., supra note 6, at 209. On cases of fraudulent transfer, which count for
a fair share of the case law on the CHD, DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES
AND MATERIALS 966–967 (3rd ed. 2002), nicely illustrates the two approaches: A, who is being
hounded by creditors, colludes with B to defraud A’s creditors by transferring A’s assets to B,
who agrees to transfer the assets back to A later. However, when the time comes for B to return
the goods, she refuses. A then petitions the court to compel B to return the assets (under
a theory of constructive trust). See, e.g., Beelman v. Beelman, 121 Ill. App. 3d 684, 688 (Ill.
App. Ct. 5th Dist. 1984); Mascenic v. Anderson, 53 Ill. App. 3d 971, 972 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist.
1977). Faced with such a scenario, courts have split on the issue of whether A’s wrongdoing is
sufficiently connected to the subject matter of his petition. Some courts have rejected plaintiffs
such as A on the grounds of unclean hands, viewing the fraudulent intention to defraud the
plaintiff’s creditors as sufficiently related or connected to the remedy for which the plaintiff
petitions the court. Other courts, in contrast, have refused to apply the CHD in similar cases
on the grounds that the matter at issue in plaintiff A’s petition is the transfer arrangement
between A and B and not the parties’ fraudulent reasons for the arrangement, finding said
reasons not directly related to the legal issues comprising A’s petition against B. For examples
of case law falling on both sides of this divide, see FISCHER, supra note 9, at 463–464 n. 16.
11. Osborne v. Nottley, 206 Ore. App. 201, 201–06 (Or. Ct. App. 2006).
12. Id. at 205.
13. Nakahara v. NS 1991 Am. Trust, 739 A.2d 770 (Del. Ch. 1998).
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it was too late to reverse it. The Delaware Court ruled that the plaintiffs’
disregard of the ongoing litigation and the violation of the agreement both
constituted unclean hands: the plaintiffs’ conduct was ethically dubious as
well as closely connected to their motion (the plaintiffs’ prior unethical
conduct was designed to obtain exactly the same advances that were the
subject of the motion).14
At times, where public interest or the gravity of the violation of the plain-
tiffs’ rights outweighed the severity or egregiousness of the plaintiffs’ prior
iniquitous or wrongful conduct, some courts have ruled against defendants’
attempts to invoke the CHD even if the plaintiffs’ hands were patently
“unclean.”15 Therefore, even when all the elements of the CHD—plaintiff
wrongdoing that is connected to the underlying transaction—are satisfied,
courts maintain discretion as to whether to apply the defense where the in-
justice to the plaintiff significantly outweighs the severity of her own wrong-
doing or where there are overriding public-policy reasons.16
Finally, the CHD is, at least traditionally, a doctrine of equity,17 applying
to parties seeking equitable relief such as injunctions, declarative remedies,
and constructive trusts. Under the CHD, even if a plaintiff’s rights in law
were violated, she is ineligible for an equitable remedy due to her unclean
hands. Some scholars have argued for expanding the CHD beyond equity
to legal remedies,18 and some courts have in fact expanded the doctrine to
claims for nonequitable remedies such as damages.19
14. Id. at 792–796.
15. Byron v. Clay, 867 F.2d 1049, 1051 (7th Cir. 1989) (“The doctrine of unclean hands,
functionally rather than moralistically conceived, gives recognition to the fact that equitable
decrees may have effects on third parties—persons who are not parties to a lawsuit, including
taxpayers and members of the law-abiding public—and so should not be entered without
consideration of those effects.”) (J. Posner); Gen. Leaseways, Inc. v. Nat’l. Truck Leasing
Assoc., 744 F.2d 588, 597 (7th Cir. 1984) (refusing to apply the doctrine of unclean hands in
an antitrust case where the application of the doctrine would have defeated the objectives of
antitrust law) (J. Posner); Republic Molding Corp. v. B.W. Photo Utilities, 319 F.2d 347, 350
(9th Cir. Cal. 1963); Novadel-Agene Corp. v. Penn, 119 F.2d 764, 766 (5th Cir. 1941); Nakahara,
supra note 6, at 523; Sheridan v. Sheridan, 247 N.J. Super. 552 (Ch. Div. 1990); DOBBS, supra
note 1, at 67.
16. At least in principle, being an equity doctrine, the CHD is discretionary. See RENDLEMAN,
supra note 6, at 209; DOBBS, supra note 1, at 67–7.
17. LAYCOCK, supra note 10, at 964; DOBBS, supra note 1, at 68.
18. Shondel v. McDermott, 775 F.2d 859, 868 (7th Cir. 1985) (J. Posner); William J.
Lawrence, III, Note, Application of the Clean Hands Doctrine in Damage Actions, 57 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 673, 678–681 (1982); Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Coming into Equity with Clean Hands, 47 MICH.
L. REV. 1065, 1093 (1949).
19. Byron v. Clay, 867 F.2d 1049, 1052 (7th Cir. 1989) (“But with the merger of law and
equity, it is difficult to see why equitable defenses should be limited to equitable suits any
more; and of course many are not so limited, and perhaps unclean hands should be one of
these.”) (citations omitted); Mona v. Mona Elec. Group, Inc. 176 Md. App. 672, 713 (Md. App.,
2007) (“Traditionally, the clean hands doctrine only applied in equity. It has been expanded,
however, to cases at law, as well.”); Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. E. Bay Union of Machinists,
227 Cal. App. 2d 675, 696 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. 1964); FISCHER, supra note 9, at 471 (“The cases
are few, but the movement is toward recognizing unclean hands as an available defense to
legal claims.”); ROBERT N. LEAVELL, JEAN C. LOVE & GRANT S. NELSON, EQUITABLE REMEDIES,
RESTITUTION AND DAMAGES 722 (4th ed. 1986).
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Sometimes the CHD is confused with a sister doctrine in law (as op-
posed to equity) called in pari delicto (“in equal fault”).20 Under in pari
delicto, the court denies a legal remedy because both parties—plaintiff and
defendant—stand in equal fault in relation to the wrong or unlawful transac-
tion complained about.21 The two doctrines exhibit some common traits22
yet are not identical.23 A second related maxim is ex turpi causa non oritur ac-
tio (no cause of action can arise out of an immoral [or illegal] inducement
[or consideration]),24 which is manifested in the doctrine of unenforce-
able contract and as a defense in tort law (today less practiced in the United
States than in other common-law jurisdictions).25 In this article I focus on
the CHD, the broadest and most widely applied of these doctrines. Yet, con-
sidering the similarities,26 some of my normative analysis of the CHD also
applies to in pari delicto and to ex turpi causa.
III. COURT INTEGRITY AND THE CLEAN HANDS DEFENSE
A. The Prevailing Judicial Position
The most dominant goal or norm that judges ascribe to the CHD is the
protection of what is best captured by the concept of “court integrity.”27
20. See BLACK, supra note 2, at 806.
21. In pari delicto applies where a plaintiff’s culpability regarding a matter at issue is equal
to or surpasses the defendant’s culpability. See FISCHER, supra note 9, at 467–470.
22. In both the CHD and in pari delicto, the iniquity of the plaintiff’s conduct as it relates
to the subject matter of the litigation plays a significant role in denying the plaintiff access
to a remedy. See FISCHER, supra note 9. In addition, court integrity is thought to ground both
doctrines (see id. at 467), and, similarly to the CHD, considerations of public interest may
supersede in pari delicto. See id. at 468; 27A AM. JUR., supra note 3, §103.
23. In contrast to the CHD, which focuses on the plaintiff’s wrongdoing, in pari delicto
focuses on the comparative degrees of wrongdoing and contributions to the underlying objec-
tionable transaction of all parties. See FISCHER, supra note 9; 27A AM. JUR., supra note 3, §103.
Moreover, while the CHD is a doctrine of equity, in pari delicto is a doctrine that applies to legal
remedies, such as damages. See LAYCOCK, supra note 10, at 964 (2002). Also, the scope of in
pari delicto is narrower than that of its equity counterpart because in pari delicto applies where
the plaintiff is of substantially equal (or greater) fault in causing the harm as is the defendant
(see id.; FISCHER, supra note 9, at 467), a condition not found in the CHD. Analytically, putting
aside the division between doctrines of law and doctrines of equity, the scope of the CHD is
wider than that of in pari delicto: the CHD covers all instances of in pari delicto as well as many
others.
24. BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY 447 (3d ed. 1969).
25. See Robert A. Prentice, Of Tort Reform and Millionaire Muggers: Should an Obscure Equitable
Doctrine Be Revived to Dent the Litigation Crisis, 32 SAN DIEGO L. REV., 53, 62–66 (1995).
26. FISCHER, supra note 9, at 471.
27. See, e.g., Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438, 485 (U.S. 1928) (the CHD is applied “in order
to . . . preserve the judicial process from contamination”) (J. Brandeis, dissenting); Adams
v. Manown, 328 Md. 463, 473 (Md. 1992) (“The clean hands doctrine is not applied for the
protection of the parties nor as a punishment to the wrongdoer; rather, the doctrine is intended
to protect the courts from having to endorse or reward inequitable conduct.”); Mona v. Mona
Elec. Group, Inc., 176 Md. App. 672, 714 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2007) (“The equitable doctrine
of unclean hands is designed to ‘prevent the court from assisting in fraud or other inequitable
conduct’ . . . it protects the integrity of the court and the judicial process by denying relief to
those persons ‘whose very presence before a court is the result of some fraud or iniquity.’”)
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This position holds that the integrity of the judiciary is compromised when
courts assent to, entertain, or even hear petitions and pleadings predicated
on or implicated by the claimant’s own wrongdoing. As the Supreme Court
put it, the court should not “be ‘the abettor of iniquity.’”28 Accordingly, a
primary interest that the CHD protects is the integrity of the court.29 In a
sense, the integrity account of the CHD rests on a justification concerned
with keeping the court’s own hands clean.
Courts are not, however, at all explicit as to what they mean when they
invoke the concept of “integrity” as a justification and an explanation of the
CHD. By way of interpretation, their reasoning appears as follows: courts
of justice should not abet iniquity and wrongdoing because doing so would
put their nature as courts of justice and fairness in peril. Furthering, toler-
ating, abetting, or turning a blind eye to wrongdoing conflicts with the core
normative tenets of courts of justice, even in cases where doing so would
further a good greater than the loss in terms of court integrity. A variant
of this position is that in cases of unclean hands, court integrity is put at
risk of becoming marred by the hypocrisy of the litigant whose hands are
unclean. Thus courts—as a matter of their core normative tenets—must not
“dirty their hands” by hearing, entertaining, or assenting to the pleadings,
complaints, and petitions of claimants whose hands are unclean. Even if
an all-things-considered analysis were to justify the court’s entertaining and
even assenting to a claim brought by a plaintiff with unclean hands, interests
of court integrity still persist and may even prevail in justifying the court in
denying the claim by employing the CHD, thereby washing its hands of a
claim tainted with the claimant’s iniquity.
Under the integrity-based account of the CHD, the relation between the
CHD and the integrity norm it supposedly embodies is structural. In ap-
plying the CHD, the court ipso facto refuses to reward, further, tolerate,
abet, or become otherwise implicated in iniquity, wrongdoing, and even
hypocrisy, which is supposedly exactly what court integrity demands in cases
involving plaintiffs with unclean hands. In this respect, because in applying
the CHD the court in effect refuses to abet, ignore, or tolerate iniquitous
(citations omitted); Premier Farm Cred., PCA v. W-Cattle, LLC, 155 P.3d 504, 519 (Colo. App.,
2006) (“The [unclean hands doctrine] is intended to protect the integrity of the court, and
simply means that equity refuses to lend its aid to a party who has been guilty of unconscionable
conduct in the subject matter in litigation.”); Osborne, supra note 11, at 205; FISCHER, supra note
9, at 462.
28. Precision, supra note 3, at 814–815.
29. DOBBS, supra note 1, at 68, 880; RENDLEMAN, supra note 6, at 209 (“In applying the
unclean hands doctrine, courts act for their own protection, and not as a matter of ‘defense’ to
the defendant.”); FISCHER, supra note 9 at 462. See, e.g., Ne. Women’s Ctr., Inc. v. McMonagle,
868 F.2d 1342, 1354 (3d Cir. Pa. 1989) (“The equitable doctrine of unclean hands is not ‘a
matter of defense to the defendant.’ Rather, in applying it ‘courts are concerned primarily
with their own integrity,’ and with avoiding becoming ‘the abettor of iniquity.’”) (citations
omitted); Nakahara, supra note 6, at 522 (“The unclean hands doctrine is aimed at providing
courts of equity with a shield from the potentially entangling misdeeds of the litigants in any
given case. The Court invokes the doctrine when faced with a litigant whose acts threaten to
tarnish the Court’s good name”).
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conduct and wrongdoing, proper judicial application of the CHD is a man-
ifestation and expression of court integrity. In a sense, the CHD makes the
ideal of court integrity more fine-grained, and in that sense, the CHD is
a constituent of the court-integrity ideal. Under this reading of the court-
integrity interpretation of the CHD, the CHD embodies a norm of court
integrity. Put differently, the norm of court integrity is at the core of the
CHD’s normative structure.30
An alternative interpretation of the integrity-based account of the CHD
views the relation between the CHD and court integrity more instrumentally.
Here, even if there are reasons for doubting whether the logic or normative
structure of the CHD indeed embodies a norm of court integrity, still, on
balance, the CHD consistently has the effect of furthering court integrity.
In the following two sections I offer reasons to doubt the dominant judicial
position that the CHD is fully aligned—structurally or instrumentally—with
court integrity.
B. The Two-Edged Nature of Court Integrity
What goes unnoticed in the judicial-integrity-based account of the CHD
is the rather obvious fact that the effect of applying the CHD is often to
let a legally recognized injustice stand. This fact gives strong reason to
doubt whether indeed the CHD always furthers or structurally embodies
the integrity of courts, which are supposedly courts of justice (especially
in their capacity as courts of equity). As explained above, the CHD rejects
claimants not based on their claims’ legal merits but due to the checkered
(related/connected) moral, ethical, or legal record of the claimant. Thus
the CHD may effect the rejection of otherwise meritorious petitions or
claims brought by individuals who suffered an actual violation of their legal
rights. While abetting, tolerating, or assisting plaintiffs who are guilty of
iniquity, hypocrisy, and wrongdoing may certainly cut against the court’s
integrity as a court of justice, allowing a legally recognized injustice or
wrong to go unchallenged and not remedied also cuts against the grain of
the court’s nature as a court of justice. This is especially true where but for
her unclean hands the claimant would have been, for all practical matters,
entitled to a remedy.
The position that it is the nature of the CHD to protect, further, and
embody the integrity of the court is therefore not as obvious as genera-
tions of common-law judges appear to have assumed. The two conflicting
30. The term “normative structure” refers to the norms and values that a legal doctrine
constitutes, embodies, or is a legal manifestation of, as well as to the logical relations be-
tween those norms and values. On the concept of “normative structure,” see JULES COLEMAN,
Epilogue to RISKS AND HARMS (SPANISH TRANSLATION), in RISKS AND HARMS 25 (2010) available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1631881. For an example of an analysis
of a legal doctrine’s normative structure, see JULES COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE 3–40
(2001) (demonstrating that tort law embodies a norm of corrective justice).
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considerations based on court integrity—not abetting wrongdoing on the
one hand and remedying and halting legally recognized wrongdoing on the
other—appear similarly fundamental tenets or commitments of the courts.
In cases in which the former outweighs the latter, the CHD actually does
more to set back court integrity than to further it.
One way to view the fact that a court may, as discussed above, forgo
applying the CHD where the severity of the wrong for which a plaintiff
seeks an equitable remedy outweighs the severity of the plaintiff’s own
past wrongdoing31 is as a weighing of the two different aspects of court
integrity. If the severity of the wrongful harm complained about outweighs
the severity of the plaintiff’s past wrongdoing, reasons from court integrity
favor not applying the CHD: presumably the integrity loss in letting the
injustice to the plaintiff stand is greater than the integrity loss in abetting
the plaintiff’s lesser wrong. The opposite is true in cases where the severity
of the wrongful harm complained about does not outweigh that of the
plaintiff’s wrongdoing. This weighing reflects both aspects of the court’s
integrity as a court of justice. In cases involving plaintiffs with unclean
hands, therefore, considerations of court integrity do not always favor not
abetting injustice and wrongdoing (which is the logic of the CHD) over
not negating or remedying it (which is a court-integrity-based reason that
conflicts with the logic of the CHD).
Formulating this double-edged relation that the CHD has with the ideal
of court integrity in terms of the concept of “agent-relative reasons” is
illuminating.32 In cases involving plaintiffs with unclean hands, courts have
an agent-relative reason not to assent to or even consider claims for equitable
remedies, even if meritorious. Here, even if the law is on the side of the
plaintiff, integrity does not permit the court—being a court of justice—
to entertain the merits of the claim. It is the agent-relative nature of the
court-integrity considerations that in a sense legitimize the courts’ turning
their back on a meritorious claim. It is the court’s nature as a court of
justice that gives rise to the integrity-based reason for rejecting plaintiffs
with unclean hands even if theirs is a meritorious claim, and even if an
arbiter unfettered by similar integrity-based constraints were obliged to
hear, entertain, and even assent to such claims. The courts’ reason for
applying the CHD to plaintiffs whose hands are unclean is not an agent-
neutral reason for action33 but rather a reason that applies uniquely to actors
31. See supra note 15.
32. An agent-relative reason is a reason the general form of which includes an essential
reference to the person who has it. See THOMAS NAGEL, THE VIEW FROM NOWHERE 152–153
(1986). If integrity-based reasons for actions derive from an agent’s basic tenets, beliefs, values,
and commitments, then such reasons apply to only those agents who possess those very same
basic tenets, beliefs, values, and commitments that give rise to those reasons. As such, assuming
that the attributes (such as basic commitments) that integrity turns on are identity markers,
integrity-based reasons for action are agent-relative.
33. An agent-neutral reason is a reason the general form of which does not include an
essential reference to the person who has it. Id.
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that are constrained by certain integrity considerations, such as courts of
justice.
Yet, as explained above, courts—as courts of justice—have what seems
an equally viable and at times overriding integrity-based agent-relative rea-
son not to let the wrong the plaintiff suffered stand. This reason, which
also derives from the court’s nature as a court of justice, gives rise to an
integrity-based agent-relative reason to remedy the harms the defendant’s
wrongdoing caused and to assent to the plaintiff’s claim. This second agent-
relative reason for action is also grounded in court integrity yet, unlike the
former court-integrity-based reason, it cuts against the logic of the CHD. In
cases involving plaintiffs with unclean hands, the court’s nature as a court
of justice generates, therefore, two conflicting integrity-based agent-relative
reasons for action.
Building on the distinction between doing (through action) and allowing
(through omission), some may object to the symmetry suggested above—in
terms of court integrity—between the court abetting plaintiff wrongdoing
and the court allowing the defendant’s wrongdoing to stand. This line of
logic views adjudicating and assenting to a claim that is tainted by the plain-
tiff’s unclean hands as active judicial abetting of (the plaintiff’s) wrongdoing
and views the denial of such a claim, on grounds of unclean hands, as a judi-
cial omission allowing (the defendant’s) wrongdoing to go unchecked. The
objection is predicated on the assumption that action somehow implicates
one’s integrity more than omission. The objection, I believe, fails for two
reasons.
First, judicial application of the CHD is better understood as a judicial act
of removing what would otherwise be the normative default: the plaintiff’s
right to be heard and even a prohibition on and a remedy for the defendant’s
wrongdoing. In applying the CHD, the court in effect changes the default
legal landscape. Here the court is not merely a bystander to the defendant’s
ongoing or unremedied past wrongdoing, because in applying the CHD,
the court (at least potentially) changes the default legal arrangement.
Second, it is erroneous to assume that agent integrity is sensitive only to
what the agent does and not to what the agent allows others to do. Failing
to oppose what one deeply perceives as evil and thereby allowing evil to
transpire may certainly erode one’s integrity. For example, the integrity of
powerful nations that hold certain principles as part of their basic moral
identity is significantly eroded when such powers allow genocide to happen,
even if those powers have no substantial role to play in the killing or in
creating the conditions that allow for the killing. Thus, even if we were
to accept that judicial application of the CHD is better understood as an
omission in relation to the defendant’s wrongdoing, this would not entail
that in so omitting, the court’s integrity necessarily suffers less of a setback.
And even if one does believe that judicial omission (letting injustice stand)
has less effect on court integrity, it certainly does not follow that it has no
effect.
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A variant of the omission/commission objection relies on viewing
private law courts as “tools” that private litigants use to obtain civil
recourse.34 Private law empowers private litigants to obtain recourse for
private wrongs they suffer.35 Accordingly, it is possible to view private law
courts as the vehicles through which private law empowers litigants. In other
words, in a sense litigants act through private law courts so that to an extent
the court acts as an agent or extension of the litigants. Accordingly, were
courts to assent to and even entertain the merits of a claim of a plaintiff
with unclean hands, the iniquity of the plaintiff would rub off on the court.
According to this reasoning, the CHD protects the agency of courts from
becoming comingled or acting as the extension of a litigant marred with
iniquity. In cases of omission—where the court allows an injustice to stand
but does not allow litigants to act through the court in bringing about the
injustice—the agency of the court is not similarly a vehicle for the agency
of litigants, and therefore the integrity of courts is not similarly blemished.
I am doubtful about this picture of the function of private law courts. Civil
law affords litigants the power (in Hohfeldian terms) to bring a suit against
those who wronged them. This power of the private law plaintiff is a power
to create a legal context in which the defendant is liable (in Hohfeldian
terms) to the power of the court to adversely alter the defendant’s rights
and entitlements in favor of remedying the plaintiff. Put a little differently,
the empowering aspect of private law is in the power of private litigants
to expose defendants to the power of courts. Once this is achieved, how-
ever, it becomes the duty of the court to decide whether the law mandates
exercising its judicial power, which was “created” or is conditioned on the
plaintiff’s power to sue.
I do not think, however, that private law goes so far as to erase partially
the court’s agency in favor of the agency of the litigant. The power that
private law affords private actors is the power to sue, which is the power to
hold defendants liable to the power of the court to remedy the plaintiff.
Private law does not, however, afford private actors the power somehow to
exercise vicariously the judicial power of imposing a remedy. This, I think,
takes the empowering metaphor of private law one step too far. Even if
the judicial powers of private law courts are conditioned on the power of
private litigants to sue, these judicial powers are not in any meaningful way
subject to the agency of private litigants. In exercising its judicial powers,
the judiciary is an objective arbiter applying the law and not an agent of any
particular litigant.
To conclude, in contrast to the majority judicial position, it seems that it is
not always true that in cases involving plaintiffs with unclean hands, reasons
34. For this objection I am grateful to one of the referees for LEGAL THEORY.
35. This is a position in line with John Goldberg’s and Benjamin Zipursky’s view of private
law and specifically tort law. See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs,
88 TEX. L. REV. 917, 945–947 (2010); Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not Corrective Justice,
91 GEO. L.J. 695, 733–756 (2003).
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of court integrity are always aligned with the logic of the CHD. At times,
hearing, entertaining, and assenting to a complaint or petition brought by
a plaintiff with unclean hands does less to set back court integrity than does
rejecting such a plaintiff on the grounds of unclean hands. Depending on
the circumstances, a norm of court integrity may lean either in favor of or
against a court applying the CHD. While the CHD may certainly capture
aspects of court integrity and at times, on balance, even further court in-
tegrity, there is strong reason to doubt whether the CHD is indeed fully
aligned with court integrity. It seems that the doctrinal logic and structure
of the CHD neither embodies a court-integrity norm nor always has the
effect of furthering court integrity.
C. Law versus Equity
Another source of skepticism as to whether the CHD is indeed aligned,
structurally or instrumentally, with a norm of court integrity is that there
are reasons to doubt whether granting a remedy of equity to a litigant with
unclean hands really detracts, on balance or otherwise, from the court’s
integrity. In applying the law—as opposed, perhaps, to equity—courts grant
remedies to iniquitous plaintiffs (whose moral iniquity is related to the
background subject matter of the suit) as a matter of regular practice.
It is well established that law and morality are not (fully) coextensive and
therefore that judges’ devotion to the law may have moral costs in particular
cases. The concept of a “legal right” allows for the category of a “legal right
to do moral wrong,” and courts of law are mostly obliged to uphold legal
rights. In fact, it seems a staple of the integrity of courts of law to uphold
legal rights even in the face of allowing, abetting, or furthering immoral
or unethical (yet legal) conduct. For example, if the right to free speech
protects the rights of Nazis to march in a Jewish neighborhood, then judicial
integrity mandates that judges uphold this right even in the face of such
egregious conduct. Accepting that fidelity to the law, even when it conflicts
with morality, is a staple of court integrity when sitting in matters of law, one
wonders whether the attributes of court integrity are indeed so radically
different when courts preside over issues of equity.
Today, long after legal institutions of equity and law were almost uni-
versally subsumed under a single judiciary,36 there is reason to doubt to
what extent the imperative of protecting the integrity of the court from
abetting or allowing iniquity and wrongdoing—through awarding equitable
remedies to claimants with unclean hands—persists. The prevailing judicial
position—that integrity is the primary norm underlying the CHD and the
primary value furthered by the CHD—seems to exhibit a trace of the com-
mon law’s past, originating in an era when courts of law and courts of equity
36. DOBBS, supra note 1, at 101–102; LEAVELL ET AL., supra note 19, at 6–11.
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were two wholly different institutions.37 Over time, courts of equity shed
most of their unique institutional and formal characteristics, so that now
courts function largely as courts of law even when sitting in equity.38 The
days when equitable remedies were fully discretionary and entirely subject
to judges’ own ethical reasoning are over.39 Today, as a practical matter, eq-
uitable remedies are more, even if not entirely, a matter of legal entitlement,
right, and formal rules than of pure judicial discretion.40
Considering that the integrity of courts of law mostly obliges them to
apply legal rules and to defend legal rights and entitlements—even in the
face of occasional moral or ethical wrong—and considering that courts
sitting in equity function much like courts of law, there is reason to think
that the relation between court integrity and the equitable doctrine of the
CHD has weakened or frayed with time. Therefore, if Richard Posner is
correct,41 and my sense is that he largely is, that today judges deciding
matters of equity reason much as they do in matters of law—primarily
applying standards, rules, and precedents and upholding litigants’ rights
and entitlements as opposed to exercising the judges’ own “free-wheeling
ethical discretion”42—then there is reason to think that even in matters of
equity, judicial integrity is a matter of fidelity more to the legal standards
and rules governing litigants’ entitlement to a remedy than to the ideal of
not abetting iniquitous conduct. It is probable that today a court’s abetting
of iniquitous conduct through the awarding of an equitable remedy may
not negatively impact court integrity all that much. Thus, in such a judicial
environment, the CHD—even as a doctrine of equity—seems no longer as
fully aligned with protecting the courts’ integrity as it perhaps once was.
D. The Concept of “Integrity”
Putting these doubts aside and assuming that the CHD is at least partially
aligned with court integrity, I now shift the analysis away from the descriptive
toward a reflection on the moral force or importance of court integrity.
37. DOBBS, supra note 1, at 48, 60–63.
38. Id. at 102–103.
39. See Shondel, supra note 18, at 868 (“A modern judge, English or American, state or
federal, bears very little resemblance to a Becket or a Wolsey or a More, but instead administers
a system of rules which bind him whether they have their origin in law or in equity and whether
they are enforced by damages or by injunctions. To tell a plaintiff that although his legally
protected rights have been invaded and he has no adequate remedy at law [i.e., damages]
the judge has decided to withhold equitable relief as a matter of discretion just would not
wash today. Even when the plaintiff is asking for the extraordinary remedy of a preliminary
injunction—extraordinary because it is often a very costly remedy to the defendant, yet is
ordered on the basis of only a summary inquiry into the merits of the plaintiff’s suit—the
request is evaluated according to definite standards, rather than committed to a free-wheeling
ethical discretion.”) (citations omitted) (J. Posner).
40. See id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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“Integrity” is a term used to refer to a variety of concepts.43 Yet, when
judges evoke “integrity” or similar concepts as the primary goal or norm
of the CHD, they do so with little elaboration or philosophical subtlety.
What exactly is the nature of the integrity interest that the CHD supposedly
embodies or furthers? What does “integrity of courts” have going for it as a
normative concept? Does court integrity have the normative weight courts
appear to ascribe to it? In other words, even if the CHD is partially aligned
with court integrity, should we care, and if so, when?
There are various accounts of integrity in the literature.44 One approach
focuses on how personal identity is related to one’s fundamental com-
mitments, conceptualizing “integrity” as an identity-preserving concept.
Bernard Williams, who is the primary expounder of this view, equates in-
tegrity with fidelity to one’s fundamental or constitutive commitments and
projects,45 projects and commitments that give meaning, structure, and
reason to one’s life. Under this view, it is through one’s integrity that one
preserves and perhaps also reaffirms as well as solidifies “who one is.”
A second perspective on integrity explores how integrity is not about who
a person is but rather about who a person may become. At times people’s
self-image and identity may be formed—either through social (e.g., discrim-
ination) or more private (e.g., abusive parenting or neglect) ill treatment—
to incorporate negative attributes such as being inferior, silent, “invisible,”
subhuman, subservient, or feeble. Resisting such oppression is often, ac-
cording to this line of reasoning on integrity and identity, a matter of one’s
integrity as an individual. Here integrity serves not to protect the funda-
mental commitments constitutive of “who one is,” for it is exactly against
“who one is” that one is in a sense rebelling. In such circumstances personal
integrity is better understood in relation to “who one may become.”46
A third account of integrity, based on the concept of an “integrated-
self,” is attributed to Harry Frankfurt.47 Here integrity is the fidelity to a set
of second-order commitments, values, and desires about which first-order
principles, commitments, values, and desires one should have. Integrity here
is found in one’s consistent adherence to the second-order set, whatever
43. See DAMIAN COX, MARGUERITE LA CAZE & MICHAEL LEVINE, INTEGRITY AND THE FRAG-
ILE SELF (2003), at 17–40; Damian Cox, Marguerite La Caze & Michael Levine, Integrity,
in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2008), available at
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/integrity.
44. For a survey of views, see id.
45. BERNARD WILLIAMS, Persons, Character and Morality, in MORAL LUCK, 1–19, 20–39 (1981);
BERNARD WILLIAMS, Integrity, in J.J.C SMART & BERNARD WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND
AGAINST, 108–117 (1973).
46. For such an approach to integrity see Susan E. Babbitt, Personal Integrity, Politics, and
Moral Imagination, in A QUESTION OF VALUES 107–134 (Samantha Brennan, Tracy Isaacs &
Michael Milde eds., 1997).
47. See Cox et al., Integrity, supra note 43; Harry Frankfurt, Freedom of the Will and the Concept
of a Person, 58 J. PHIL. 5–20 (1971); Harry Frankfurt, Identification and Wholeheartedness, in
RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER, AND THE EMOTIONS 27–45 (Ferdinand Schoeman ed., 1987).
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its substance and content, in forming one’s first-order set, making for an
integrated and coherent self.
Another perspective on integrity views it as a social virtue.48 Cheshire
Calhoun argues that an important aspect of integrity is standing up for
what one thinks is morally right.49 As such, integrity is a virtue of social
responsibility and participation. Here integrity demands that people not
keep their normative views to themselves or renounce them in public when it
suits them but rather that people sincerely contribute to the social discourse
and deliberation on the social good.
Yet another view of integrity, and the one probably most in line with
viewing the CHD as the protector of court integrity, is what is appropriately
called the “clean hands conception of integrity.”50 In this view, integrity in
a sense protects a person’s unconditional normative commitments, demar-
cating the line beyond which a person will not cooperate with what she
perceives as evil and will not allow such evil to be furthered through her
agency. In other words, there are certain things that people with integrity
must and must not do, regardless of the all-things-considered moral im-
plications of such actions or omissions. Put differently, at times a person
of integrity simply “cannot” and in a sense should not do some φ, even if
φ-ing would result in a state of affairs that—all things considered—would
be morally better than the state of affairs that would result from that person
preserving her integrity through not φ-ing.51 For example, when Martin
Luther said, “here I stand. I can do no other,” he was possibly expressing
the position that although challenging the Catholic Church was predicted
to have dire consequences for Luther as well as for others, Luther simply
could not—as a matter of his most basic beliefs and commitments—remain
silent.
E. The Moral Significance of Institutional Integrity
It is important to note that court integrity is a form of institutional integrity,
not personal integrity. To the extent that integrity is of intrinsic moral value,
it is most likely so as a concept relating to individuals. As reflected in the
various conceptions of integrity presented above, it is personal integrity that
is considered a candidate for being a virtue or of intrinsic moral value.52
By implication, institutional integrity does not appear a viable candidate
for counting as a virtue or for having intrinsic moral value. Generally the
48. Damian Cox, Marguerite La Caze, & Michael Levine, Should We Strive for Integrity?, 33 J.
VALUE INQUIRY 519–530 (1999).
49. Cheshire Calhoun, Standing for Something, 92 J. PHIL. 235 (1995).
50. Id. at 246–252; WILLIAMS, Integrity, supra note 45.
51. Of course, which actions challenge one’s integrity depends on what one’s unconditional
normative commitments, principles, values, and beliefs happen to be.
52. Whether integrity is a virtue or in some sense morally good is a matter of contention.
See Cox et al., Integrity, supra note 43, at 41–100.
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integrity of objects (i.e., nonliving things) seems void of intrinsic moral
value. Looking for such value, for example, in the integrity of a pencil
factory, a political party, or a library seems peculiar. Courts are institutions,
not persons, and as such, institutional integrity just does not seem something
morality is concerned with for its own sake. These examples, of course, do
not strictly prove the proposition that institutional integrity lacks intrinsic
moral value. My position here is based more on stipulation—grounded in
a person-affecting approach to morality—than on argument.
In any case, even within a person-affecting scheme there are at least two
exceptions to my stipulation that institutional integrity is not of intrinsic
moral value. Legal institutions such as courts involve, effect, and are consti-
tuted by persons. It is when people maintain significant attachments to an
institution or when, in their capacity as agents of an institution, individuals
are constituents of the institution that court integrity may be of intrinsic
moral value. These two exceptions are explored in the next two sections.
The possibility of ascribing integrity to institutions does not challenge
the hypothesis that institutional integrity is generally not of intrinsic moral
value. As demonstrated below, at times it is fitting to conceptualize an institu-
tion’s preservation of and fidelity to its own basic tenets, commitments, and
values in terms of integrity. Yet, it is not at all clear why the preservation of
and fidelity to institutional tenets, internal logic, coherence, commitments,
and core values is a virtue or of intrinsic moral value when divorced from
effecting or otherwise involving an individual person in a morally significant
way.
Where the integrity of objects—such as institutions—is of intrinsic value,
such value is mostly best characterized as aesthetic. Integrity is often under-
stood in relation to keeping things intact, harmonious, uncorrupted, and,
in a sense, true and consistent with their internal form or logic. For exam-
ple, the integrity of a collection may refer to the collection’s completeness
or uniformity; the integrity of a strategy may refer to its flawlessness; the
integrity of a forest may refer to the forest’s pristineness; the integrity of a
piece of music may refer to its harmony (or disharmony in the case of an
atonal piece); the integrity of a newspaper may refer to its accurate report-
ing. In all these examples, integrity may have intrinsic value yet it does not
draw said value from morality. Following this line of logic, it is possible that
court integrity is of aesthetic value and as such may function as a reason for
the CHD. Yet in most cases, the force or weight of such a reason seems neg-
ligible when compared to the reasons for remedying the legally recognized
wrongs suffered by plaintiffs who happen to have unclean hands.
The proposition that the intrinsic value of the integrity of objects is a mat-
ter of aesthetics and not morality does not rule out the integrity of an object
having moral significance through its effects. For example, compromising
the integrity of a work of art—such as adding color to the black-and-white
movie Casablanca—would not only decrease the aesthetic value inherent
in the film but might also cause severe distress to cinema lovers. To give a
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second example, erosion in the integrity of a newspaper committed to truth-
ful reporting may have an adverse impact on society and by extension on
the well-being of the individuals that comprise that society. Where erosions
in institutional integrity have morally significant effects, which, as I explain
below, they do in the case of court integrity,53 protecting such integrity is
of instrumental or functional moral value. Thus, but for the two instances
discussed below, the moral value of court integrity is most likely extrinsic,
not warranting protecting or solidifying court integrity for its own sake.
F. The Integrity of Judges
One exception accounting for the intrinsic moral value of court integrity is
its relation to the integrity of judges. After all, it is flesh-and-blood judges
who comprise the judiciary and decide the fate of lawsuits. While we may
have no moral reason to care about the integrity of courts per se, protecting
court integrity because of its implications for the integrity of judges as judges
is quite another matter. If, indeed, hearing, entertaining, and assenting to
the claims of plaintiffs with unclean hands abets iniquity or wrongdoing,
then any judge who does so compromises her integrity as a judge. Protect-
ing court integrity may have value, therefore, as an aspect of protecting
individual judges’ professional integrity.
Protecting court integrity in cases of unclean hands ipso facto protects the
professional integrity of the judges comprising the court. In other words,
court integrity in the clean hands context is at times a category or aspect
of judge integrity. Accepting that the professional integrity of judges is
of intrinsic moral value as a category of personal integrity, perhaps court
integrity transitively also enjoys such a status to the extent that it is an aspect
of judge integrity.54
Assuming one were to accept that judge integrity is intrinsically morally
valuable, that court integrity is at times an aspect of judge integrity, and by
extension, that court integrity has intrinsic moral value, does it really matter
all that much? Put differently, what is the normative weight or significance of
judge integrity in this context? Do the interests of several individual judges
in their own professional integrity as judges pack sufficient normative force
to justify a legal doctrine that has the effect of rejecting countless merito-
rious claims and of allowing a similar number (assuming the law is moral)
of injustices to stand? Taking an all-things-considered approach, the signif-
icance of court integrity—as an aspect of individual judges’ professional
integrity—seems low. Yet, as explained above, personal integrity often func-
tions to defy—in the case of particular individuals—what are contradictory
53. See infra Section III.H.
54. This line of reasoning requires accepting that the “abetting” of iniquity presumably in-
volved in a court’s assenting to the claims of plaintiffs with unclean hands is indeed deleterious
to judges’ integrity, a position challenged by the arguments given in Sections III.B. and III.C.
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and even overriding reasons for action. In this respect, the CHD functions
to allow judges the legal space to draw an imaginary line in the sand and—
when they “can do no other”—refuse to sacrifice their integrity when faced
with the prospect of allowing or abetting wrongdoing.
While I doubt whether judges indeed have such strong integrity-driven
recoil in most equity cases involving plaintiffs with unclean hands, at times
they certainly may. And assuming that such integrity-driven reactive emo-
tions are good indicators of genuine integrity conflicts, perhaps at times
assenting to and even entertaining the claims of plaintiffs with unclean
hands indeed compromises the integrity of judges. Thus occasionally the
role the CHD plays in protecting court integrity may have the unique and
morally significant role of allowing judges to protect their own integrity.
This line of reasoning does not necessarily point to an intrinsic moral value
in all the instances in which the CHD protects court integrity, but it does
point to such a value in some such cases.
G. The Integrity of the Courts, the Legal Community,
and the Citizenry
Another line of reasoning for recognizing that court integrity has intrinsic
moral value depends on accepting that how well social groups or institutions
fare at times determines, ipso facto, aspects of the well-being of individuals
constitutively attached to those groups or institutions. This occurs where
attachments to a group or institution partially constitute individuals’ identi-
ties. In such circumstances, how well the group or institution fares is often,
ipso facto, an aspect of how well those constitutively attached individu-
als fare. Considering that the well-being of individuals has intrinsic moral
value, the same is true for certain aspects of the well-being of the groups or
institutions to which they are formatively or constitutively attached.55
Such a constitutive relation may exist between citizens and the legal sys-
tems to which they are subject, especially in democracies in which the legal
system plays a significant role in forming national identity and the idea
of citizenship (as is the case in the United States). Indeed, where an oth-
erwise just legal system performs a great injustice, there is often a sense
in which such a moral failure ipso facto taints the community, the nation,
and the citizenry at large. Such mass tainting through association mainly
occurs, to the extent that it does, in cases of grave injustice and moral fail-
ings of the judiciary. Clear-cut examples are the legal regime of slavery and
the Supreme Court’s ruling on the constitutionality of the internment of
55. I develop a theory of this notion of ipso facto harm as a matter of constituting attach-
ments elsewhere. See Ori J. Herstein, Historic Injustice, Group Membership and Harm to Individuals:
Defending Claims for Historic Justice from the Non-Identity Problem, 25 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 229
(2009).
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American citizens of Japanese descent during World War II.56 Yet, fortu-
nately, in liberal democracies such cases of grave judicial moral failing are
relatively rare. Most communal or institutional infractions, failings, sins, and
wrongs do not taint all their members, devotees, or citizens.57 More modest
failings may, however, be constitutively detrimental to legal practitioners,
such as lawyers, judges, law professors, and students, as well as any other
individuals whose sense of self is strongly tied to and intertwined with the
legal profession, community, and institutions.
Assuming that ipso facto constitutive harm—be it to members of the citi-
zenry at large or to members of the legal community—at times indeed arises
in cases of unclean hands, the question then becomes: What is the weight
or severity of this harm? My sense is that at least in certain cases—where the
institutional attachment is strong and/or the institutional failing severe—it
is possible that the harm involved is more than negligible, mustering some
normative force behind the CHD in its capacity as a protector of court in-
tegrity. However, similarly to the judge-integrity analysis offered above, the
line of reasoning presented here at best recognizes intrinsic moral value in
only some instances of furthering court integrity.
H. The Functional Moral Significance of Court Integrity
If morally favorable or detrimental, the consequences, results, and effects
of erosions in the integrity of courts may infuse the CHD, which presum-
ably furthers court integrity, with instrumental moral value. An example
of a possible detriment of erosions in court integrity is the corruption of
judges’ sense of justice or discipline in pursuing justice. Upholding court
integrity may have the favorable effect of cementing and furthering the
integrity and professionalism of judges. Protecting the pride and sense of
vocation of members of the judiciary through protecting the integrity of
the courts is another possible favorable effect of preserving court integrity.
Yet, considering that preferring what is legally valid to what is morally right
is not an uncommon occurrence in judicial practice, I doubt whether an
equity system lacking a CHD would indeed actually suffer such setbacks.
Considering that applying the legal over the moral in matters of law does
not appear to have the detrimental effects considered above, there is no
reason to think that such detriments would arise in cases of equity. The
worry seems, in other words, exaggerated.
More significant, I think, is the fact that erosion in court integrity may
influence the public’s perception of the integrity, decency, and fairness of
the courts, which in turn might have detrimental implications for courts’
legitimacy. In other words, the fact that people’s trust in and respect for
the courts is connected to the integrity of the court (and the court’s actual
56. Karamatsu v. U.S., 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
57. Herstein, supra note 55, at 243–244.
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 21 Oct 2011 IP address: 128.253.174.34
20 ORI J. HERSTEIN
integrity undoubtedly plays a role in forming the public’s perception of the
court’s integrity) may invest court integrity with (instrumental) moral value.
Under such circumstances it is conceivable that the loss of integrity, which
is presumably involved in courts entertaining and assenting to the claims
of plaintiffs with unclean hands, may erode the public’s favorable image of
and trust in the courts, resulting in a negative impact on courts’ legitimacy.
This is likely what Justice Brandeis was getting at in associating the CHD
with maintaining “respect for law”58 and the promotion of “confidence in
the administration of justice.”59 It is primarily under such circumstances that
the instrumental benefits the CHD offers in terms of court integrity may
have more than negligible normative force. Whether and to what degree
entertaining and assenting to the claims of plaintiffs with unclean hands are
detrimental to the public’s perception of court integrity and, by extension,
to the legitimacy of the courts are empirical questions I do not have the
tools to answer. Nevertheless, considering that most private law disputes
attract little to no public attention, the implications the CHD has for the
public’s trust in the judiciary is probably quite low. This may not be so in
high-profile civil litigations as well as in disputes of public law involving
equitable remedies that touch on widely contested matters. In cases such as
these, the benefits the CHD offers in terms of preserving court integrity—as
a means of preserving court legitimacy—appear rather weighty.
I. Conclusion: Court Integrity and the Clean Hands Defense
The outcome of my assessment of the majority judicial position—that the
CHD is primarily a doctrine of court integrity—is mixed. As shown above,
the effects that the merging of law and equity have presumably had on
the judicial craft and reasoning in equity cases raise doubts as to whether
granting equitable remedies to plaintiffs with unclean hands indeed detracts
from courts’ integrity. Putting this speculation aside, there is reason to doubt
the premise that the ideal of court integrity is fully aligned with the CHD
both structurally—the CHD probably does not embody a norm of court
integrity—and in its effects—on balance the CHD does not always further
court integrity. Yet it still seems plausible that in many cases the CHD does
further court integrity.
As for the prescriptive aspects of the court-integrity account, I conclude
above that but for two types of exceptions in which the court-integrity ben-
efits of the CHD are at times morally significant—where court integrity is
an aspect of judge integrity or is constitutive of institutionally attached indi-
viduals’ well-being—court integrity appears lacking in intrinsic moral value.
I next move to the integrity-related instrumental aspects of the CHD. The
protections that the CHD offers court integrity really matter primarily in
58. Olmstead, supra note 27, at 484.
59. Id.
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circumstances where the court’s integrity loss, which is presumably inher-
ent in judicial assent to the claims of plaintiffs with unclean hands, has the
effect of eroding the public’s trust in the courts.
Having fleshed out and developed the judicial account of the CHD as a
doctrine of court integrity and having made an earnest attempt to present it
in a favorable light, I conclude that although it is the long-standing position
of the vast majority of legal authorities, the integrity-based approach is at best
only partially correct. Most significantly, although court integrity possibly
plays some role in the CHD and perhaps even offers it significant normative
support in certain cases, there are reasons to doubt that the CHD is fully
aligned—structurally or instrumentally—with court integrity. Developing
an alternative or supplementary account of the normativity of the CHD is
the aspiration of the remainder of this article.
IV. “WHO ARE YOU TO COMPLAIN?” THE CLEAN HANDS
DEFENSE AND THE TU QUOQUE
A. The Clean Hands Defense as a Doctrine of Standing
The sanction the CHD imposes is well characterized as a loss of standing to
claim a remedy or as a loss of the right to be heard. As Dan Dobbs puts it, the
CHD denies a plaintiff’s right of entry.60 A plaintiff found wanting under the
CHD loses her suit/claim/complaint regardless of its merits. It is a doctrine
concerned not with the substantive rules determinative of the merits of a
complaint but with the conditions for whether those rules are applicable and
available to assess those merits. The CHD denies a plaintiff entry, regardless
of the substantive or procedural merits of her claim, because that plaintiff
is deemed unworthy of having her complaint heard and entertained on its
merits. As the famous maxim of the CHD proclaims: “he who comes into
equity must come with clean hands” [my emphasis].61 or in other words, the
protections of equity are not available to plaintiffs whose hands are unclean.
As such, the CHD is in effect a threshold doctrine or a doctrine of standing
setting the conditions for the applicability and availability of the substantive
rules that govern the subject matter of legal claims.
Analyzing the sanction of the CHD in terms of pragmatics proves illu-
minating. Statements are often not just locutions, that is, do not express
only certain content, but are often also illocutions, that is, statements of-
ten also do things.62 What a statement, or more broadly, what a speech act
does or creates, that is, a statement’s illocutionary component, constitutes
its “force.”63 For example, the statement “I will call the police” may have the
60. DOBBS, supra note 1, at 44.
61. BLACK, supra note 2.
62. On “locutions” and “illocutionary,” see J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS
(1962).
63. Id. at 100–101.
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illocutionary force of a threat, prediction, or assertion. Similarly, expres-
sions of normative assessment often do not only reflect (accurately or not)
normative states of affairs but also blame, judge, condemn, demand, and so
on, and thereby create and constitute normative facts.
Legal complaints filed in court are, of course, locutions, yet they also
have an illocutionary component. A legal complaint properly filed in court
is not only a document containing and expressing propositions about the
law; such documents also create new legal facts: initiating litigation, making
a legal claim against the defendants, and introducing a matter the court
must address, hear, and entertain.
In the terms of pragmatics, the sanction of the CHD is the deflating of
the illocutionary force of legal complaints. The application of the CHD
effects the rejection of a legal complaint on the grounds that the plaintiff
who brought the complaint is deemed lacking the requisite legal standing
to make such a complaint. While the plaintiff’s claim may itself be legally
valid and meritorious, the CHD deems that based on the rules of equity,
this plaintiff cannot bring that claim before the court. Normally, the court
would have been obliged to hear and entertain the plaintiff’s complaint,
but for reasons of unclean hands, the plaintiff is in effect found to lack the
normative power to bring a complaint that the court is obliged to hear. Be-
cause it is this person’s complaint, the complaint simply lacks illocutionary
(legal) force in the form of constituting a set of legal claims the court is
obliged to hear and entertain.
Put differently, it is the plaintiff’s lack of standing that deflates the il-
locutionary force her complaint would normally have had. Were another
party—innocent of any related wrongdoing—to bring exactly the same com-
plaint and follow exactly the same rules of procedure, all other things being
equal, the complaint would have been successful not only in the truth-value
of its locutions but also in illocutionary terms: it would have successfully
created and constituted a (new) legal fact in the form of a legal claim that
defendants are required to answer for and courts are obliged to hear and
entertain on its merits.
The CHD is, therefore, a doctrine of standing. The grounds on which the
CHD determines (the lack of) standing—a plaintiff’s connected/related
wrongdoing—are, however, unique, reflecting the unusual norms the CHD
embodies.
B. Tu Quoque and In Delicto
Tu quoque (“you too!”) stands for a normative phenomenon that is as
loosely defined as it is widespread. Other expressions that capture this phe-
nomenon are “the pot calling the kettle black”; “look who’s talking!”; “who
are you to say that?!”; and “how wilt thou say to thy brother, let me pull out
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the mote out of thine eye; and, behold, a beam is in thine own eye?”64 These
sayings are properly invoked in a variety of circumstances against those who
claim, demand, condemn, criticize, judge, or blame others for wrongdoing
while they themselves are guilty of similar or related wrongdoing. For ex-
ample, if I regularly fail to return my friends’ phone calls it seems that—for
tu quoque reasons—I am in no position to judge, criticize, chastise, blame,
or make demands on others for failing to do the same.
It is important to notice that the tu quoque maxim does not negate the
truth-value of a statement’s normative or evaluative locution. I may, for ex-
ample, be correct in stating that friends should return each other’s phone
calls and that in not returning mine, my friend acted wrongly. Yet, consider-
ing that I myself fail in returning my friend’s calls, according to the tu quoque
I am in no position to blame, judge, condemn, or make claims on my friend
for similarly not returning my calls. I may, of course, succeed in expressing
or vocalizing the semantics of blame, judgment, condemnation, or claim,
but such statements would not constitute blame, judgment, condemnation,
or claim.
What the tu quoque maxim challenges is not the truth-value of the nor-
mative content of a statement but the statement’s normative illocutionary
force.65 One should not confuse the tu quoque maxim, as it is explained here,
with “ad hominem tu quoque,” which is the baseless yet often used rhetorical
ploy of criticizing the validity of a normative position by way of accusing
those arguing the position with tu quoque. The tu quoque undermines one’s
capacity normatively to criticize, blame, judge, condemn, claim, and so on,
not one’s capacity to express normative truths that may ground criticism,
judgment, blaming, and condemnation.66 In the circumstances of the tu
quoque, the guilty judge/condemner/blamer/claimant may, therefore, ex-
press valid normative statements of blame, judgment, condemnation, or
claim. Yet, because the party expressing such normative statements is him-
self guilty of similar or related wronging, said statements lack normative
traction; they are expressions of the semantics of blame, judgment, con-
demnation, and claim that fail to blame, judge, condemn, or claim.
While similar, one should not confuse the tu quoque with a related maxim
that I call “in delicto” (“at fault”).67 In delicto is reflected in statements such as
64. MATTHEW 7:4 (King James ed.) (Sermon on the Mount).
65. G.A. Cohen, Casting the First Stone: Who Can, and Who Can’t, Condemn the Terrorists? 58
ROYAL INST. PHIL. SUPP. 113, 120 (2006).
66. Id. at 121. For a related view, see Saul Smilansky, The Paradox of Moral Complaint, 18
UTILITAS 284, 289 (2006). Smilansky considers divorcing the wrongness of an action from the
issue of whether the victim of the action can or cannot morally complain about that action.
The motivation for doing so is to accommodate the intuition that, at least in some cases, a
victim of a wrong who is also guilty of a similar wrong may not complain about the wrong
she suffers even though we genuinely believe she was treated wrongly. Yet Smilansky questions
this approach because he finds it equally if not more troubling to part with the principle that
“[i]f it is morally impermissible to treat E in a certain way, then E has grounds for complaint if
anyone treats E in that way,” which he calls “the principle of the transfer of complaint.”
67. Cohen, supra note 65, at 123.
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“you made me do it”; “you’re involved yourself”; “you started it”; and “it was
your idea.” In delicto is subject to the same logic—in terms of pragmatics—as
is the tu quoque. An important difference between tu quoque and in delicto is
the relation between the wrongdoing that is the subject of blame, judgment,
condemnation, or claim and the wrongdoing of the person expressing the
blame, judgment, condemnation, or claim. In cases of tu quoque a party A—
who previously performed a certain wrongful action φ—blames, judges, or
condemns B for similar, connected, or related wrongdoings. The in delicto
maxim involves cases wherein A blames, judges, or condemns B for a specific
wrong that A himself is also involved with or responsible for.
In the in delicto scenario, A’s prior wrongdoing is part and parcel of φ, the
very same wrongful conduct for which he now blames, judges, and condemns
B. In cases of tu quoque, A’s prior wrong is distinguishable from B’s wrong,
even though the parties’ wrongs are similar in kind or were performed
within the same transaction, factual background, or set of circumstances. For
example, under in delicto a superior cannot condemn her subordinate for
performing a wrong the superior ordered the subordinate to carry out, even
if the subordinate should not have complied. Under tu quoque, a superior
cannot condemn a subordinate for performing a wrong if the superior
herself committed or was culpably involved in wrongs that are either similar
or were performed as part of the same overarching transaction or within
the same set of circumstances as was the subordinate’s wrongdoing. The
in delicto maxim is reflected in the legal doctrine of in pari delicto discussed
above.68
C. The Clean Hands Defense, Tu Quoque, and In Delicto
By now it is clear where the argument is headed: the tu quoque maxim and
the CHD have largely the same logic. Both deflate the illocutionary force
of normative (moral, ethical, or legal) speech acts (such as statements of
condemnation or formal legal complaints) on the grounds of the speaker’s
or claimant’s guilty wrongdoing, where the wrongdoing is connected or
similar to the wrongdoing for which the claimant or speaker is claiming,
blaming, judging, or condemning others. Moreover, the CHD and the tu
quoque are both doctrines of standing: the guilt of the speaker or claimant
does not affect the truth-value or accuracy of her normative statement or
claim but denies her standing actually to make the claim, blame, judgment,
or condemnation that the statement purports to embody.69 If someone
else, not guilty of related or similar wrongdoing, were to make exactly the
same statement, all other things being equal, her statement or complaint
68. See supra notes 20–26 and accompanying text.
69. On the tu quoque as a norm of standing, see, e.g., Cohen, supra note 65, at 119–121; R.
Jay Wallace, Hypocrisy, Moral Address, and the Equal Standing of Persons, 38 PHIL. & PUB. AFF., 307,
317 (2010).
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would have successfully embodied a claim, judgment, condemnation, or
legal complaint.
The CHD probably also covers scenarios of in delicto. As a matter of legal
interpretation, performing the same wrong, as is the requirement for in
delicto, may certainly fall under the CHD’s categories of a “connected” or
“related” wrongdoing. As such, the scope of the CHD is wider than that
of the tu quoque in that it also incorporates cases of in delicto. Therefore,
instances of tu quoque and in delicto arising in matters of equity fall under
the purview of the CHD, while instances of in delicto arising in matters of
law fall under the purview of in pari delicto.
The CHD largely shares a normative structure with the tu quoque and in
delicto (but for the caveat that the CHD accommodates both maxims). For
reasons of simplicity and considering that it is the broader, more central
norm, I will focus mostly on the tu quoque. Cases of tu quoque turn on the
identity, similarity, or connectedness of the plaintiff’s and the defendant’s
wrongs. Similarly, the operative relation in the CHD is connectedness. In
addition, the tu quoque and the CHD are both norms of standing that de-
flate the moral or ethical (in the case of tu quoque) or the legal (in the
case of the CHD) illocutionary force of claims expressed or brought by
wrongdoers, regardless of the truth-value or legal merits of the claims’
locutions.
D. The Morality of the Tu Quoque
Switching gears from the descriptive to the prescriptive, one wonders
whether the tu quoque is morally valid. The norm of tu quoque has a strong
presence in natural normative parlance and is thought to capture some-
thing of moral significance, which lends some plausibility to the idea that
the tu quoque is morally valid. Yet merely pointing out that the norma-
tive landscape contains the tu quoque hardly settles the matter. After all,
the tu quoque has an effect that is prima facie problematic: silencing peo-
ple’s otherwise potentially valid normative illocutions. Analyzing the place
tu quoque captures in the logic of morality is beyond the purview of this
essay. Yet the idea that morality contains such a norm does not seem im-
probable and is certainly intuitive. When, for example, the deranged dic-
tator of Libya, Muammar Gaddafi, threatens rebel forces and their civil-
ian supporters with imminent massacre, his subsequent condemnation of
NATO’s military intervention in the Libyan conflict rings hollow. Some-
how the condemnation or blame fails as condemnation or blame when
uttered by Gaddafi, even if in principle the content expressed were morally
valid.
While the tu quoque is a fairly neglected normative phenomenon in the
philosophical literature, some accounts, primarily in the contexts of the
concepts of “blame” and “complaint,” have recently emerged.
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Gerald Dworkin offers a functional grounding of the tu quoque.70 Ac-
cording to Dworkin, the point of expressions of moral judgment such as
blaming, judging, criticizing, or disapproving is to effect some change in
the behaviors or character of the agents toward whom the statements are
directed. Given that people tend to seek the respect of those whom they
respect, criticism delivered by those guilty of tu quoque is less likely to achieve
the desired transformation in the recipient’s character. When a party who is
himself subject to tu quoque expresses moral criticism, in a sense he “shoots
himself in the foot,” because were the recipient of the criticism to accept
the criticism, she would thereby presumably lose respect for the person
expressing the criticism (due to his own susceptibility to his own criticism)
and therefore be less likely to alter her conduct according to that criticism.
Thomas Scanlon explains that blaming wrongdoers incorporates a con-
demnation for willingly behaving in a way that makes the wrongdoer into
“someone towards whom [the condemner] cannot have the intentions and
expectations that constitute normal moral relations,”71 such as trust and re-
liance. Some such normal expectations are relational, mutual, or reciprocal.
In cases of tu quoque or hypocrisy, Scanlon explains that the condemner’s
own past wrongdoing has already impaired the parties’ moral relationship.
There is something false, therefore, in the former wrongdoer’s condem-
nation of the subsequent wrongdoer.72 The condemner rails against the
wrongdoer for undermining their moral relation yet she herself has already
undermined the factual basis for her condemnation—that such a moral
relation existed for the wrongdoer to undermine—by her own past wrong-
doing. In this, Scanlon does not claim that the circumstances of the tu quoque
are in any way right or wrong, only that the tu quoque captures a practical fail-
ure in the hypocrite’s condemnation: the wrongdoer-complainant, -blamer,
or -condemner has nothing to condemn, blame, or complain about.
Saul Smilansky, in his discussion of the concept of “moral complaint,”
suggests thinking of the moral basis of the tu quoque in terms of what he
calls the “legislative nature of morality and moral actions,”73 which stands
for the idea that one’s morally significant actions are in a sense instances
of self-reflexive moral legislation by which one makes it (or “legislates” it
to be) morally permissible to act toward him or her in a manner similar
to how he or she acts toward others; a position rooted in Kantian moral
philosophy. As such, Smilansky appears to ascribe the tu quoque with moral
content: denying the wrongdoer-complainant her moral complaint is just.
Notice that for both Scanlon and Smilansky, the viability of the illocutionary
component of statements of blame and condemnation is parasitic on the
70. Gerald Dworkin, Morally Speaking, in REASONING PRACTICALLY 182, 184–186 (Edna
Ullmann-Margalit ed., 2000).
71. THOMAS M. SCANLON, MORAL DIMENSIONS (2008), at 175–176.
72. Id. at 175–179.
73. Saul Smilansky, Some Thoughts on Terrorism, Moral Complaint, and the Self-Reflexive and
Relational Nature of Morality, 34 PHILOSOPHIA 65, 66 (2006).
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truth-value of the statements’ locutions: the reason the illocution fails is that
the locution is somehow false.
Yet another recent contribution to the philosophical reflection on the
morality of the loss of standing in circumstances of the tu quoque is that of Jay
Wallace.74 Wallace understands the tu quoque to derive from the fact that the
hypocrite-blamer-wrongdoer exposes himself to condemnation, rejection,
and resentment for his hypocritical blaming of others, which grounds the re-
jection of his standing to blame, condemn, or resent. Blaming, condemning,
or resenting incorporates a reactive emotion to wrongdoing; in blaming,
condemning, and resenting the wrongdoing of others, one demonstrates
that one values the moral value the wrongdoers violated. Wallace believes
that blaming, condemning, or resenting others for violating certain moral
values gives rise to a practical commitment to subject one’s own attitudes and
behavior to similar scrutiny. A condemner-wrongdoer who neither repents,
corrects, nor comes to terms with her own wrongdoing violates this practi-
cal commitment and thereby undermines her standing to persist with the
blaming, condemning, and resenting that give rise to those commitments
of self-scrutiny.
According to Wallace, what is objectionable about the circumstances of
the tu quoque is that one—who is aware of and values the value she herself
has violated—holds her own interests and the interests of the victims of
others in higher regard than she holds the interests of those who victimize
others and the interests of her own victims. Doing so violates what Wallace
holds as fundamental to morality: the equal moral worth of all individuals.
Denying others equal moral regard or respect in this way lays open the
hypocrite to the resentment of others and to the rejection of her own
standing to blame, condemn, or resent others. Here it is the wrongness of
hypocrisy and not a pragmatic failure in illocution that allows ignoring the
hypocrite’s hypocritical allegations.
Finally, it is possible to view moral desert as the moral grounds of the
tu quoque. This view is perhaps not far from Wallace’s. The idea is that the
hypocrisy of bringing the claim or of blaming makes the hypocrite deserving
of losing the standing to blame or to bring such a claim. Notice that this
retributive grounding of the tu quoque differs from the retributive account
given below of the CHD (Section V). Here the retribution is for one’s
hypocrisy, while in the latter account the retribution is for the hypocrite’s
past (similar or connected) wrongdoing.
It is important to note, however, that at least in some cases there are strong
reasons for allowing hypocrites standing, the tu quoque not withstanding. As
Smilansky points out, “one surely wishes that the Nazis [had] practiced less
what they preached.”75 Moreover, at times social change requires a degree
74. Wallace, supra note 69, at 323–331.
75. For a brief account of more problems with ascribing hypocrisy with overriding moral
weight, see Saul Smilansky, On Practicing What We Preach, 31 AM. PHIL. Q. 73, 78–79 (1994).
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of hypocritical locutions, as was the case with slave-owning abolitionists.
There are no doubt further such arguments.
In any case, at least some of the views presented above ascribe moral value
to the tu quoque. Under Dworkin’s account, the tu quoque has morally desir-
able effects, injecting the tu quoque with extrinsic moral value. Smilansky, on
the other hand, views the tu quoque as a manifestation of a fundamental tenet
of Kantian moral philosophy. Wallace also ascribes moral value to tu quoque
as a morally just product of a violation of agents’ equal moral worth. Finally,
an account based on moral desert is also plausible. There is, therefore, at
least some reason to think that the legal norm of the tu quoque embodied in
the CHD has a counterpart in the form of a moral norm of tu quoque.
V. THE CLEAN HANDS DEFENSE: PUNISHMENT
AND RETRIBUTION
A. The Clean Hands Defense as a Doctrine of Retribution
In laying out the rules of the CHD, numerous courts have explicitly said
that this doctrine is not designed or applied in order to punish.76 Very few
courts appear to take the contrary position.77 In direct contrast to what
most courts claim, there is at least some reason to think that the CHD is a
punitive doctrine.
In fact, I think it is obvious. A mark of punishment is that sanction,
suffering, or deprivation is imposed for an (actual or supposed) wrong.
In other words, punishment is meted out by reason of or on the grounds
of wrongdoing.78 Moreover, punishment is usually directed at an actual or
apparent wrongdoer for her actual or apparent wrongdoing.79 The structure
of the CHD’s doctrine is centered on plaintiff iniquity (a wrongdoing) as
the reason for rejecting the plaintiff’s claim or for depriving the plaintiff of
the right to be heard (a sanction); and it is the wrongdoer herself (the party
with unclean hands) who is sanctioned for her wrongdoing (the connected
iniquitous conduct).80 That the CHD is applied for reason of wrongdoing
76. See, e.g., Johnson, supranote 1, at 403 (“The abstention which equity exercises, as it should
here, under the short-hand phrase of the ‘clean hands doctrine’ is not due to any desire to
punish a litigant for his uncleanliness”) (J. Frankfurter, dissenting); Keystone Driller Co. v. Gen.
Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240, 245 (1933) (“They apply the maxim, not by way of punishment
for extraneous transgressions, but upon considerations that make for the advancement of
right and justice.”); W. L.A. Inst. for Cancer Res. v. Mayer, 366 F.2d 220, 227 (9th Cir. 1966);
Thompson v. Orcutt, 257 Conn. 301, 310 (Conn. 2001); Adams v. Manown, 328 Md. 463, 482
(Md. 1992); Mona v. Mona Elec. Group, Inc., 176 Md. App. 672, 714 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2007);
Hicks v. Gilbert, 135 Md. App. 394, 400 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000).
77. See, e.g., Busch v. Baker, 79 Fla. 113, 119 (Fla. 1920).
78. John Gardner, Introduction, in H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY xxv (2008).
79. H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY (2008), at 4–5.
80. I am unaware of cases recognizing vicarious or collective unclean hands under the CHD.
By “collective unclean hands,” I am referring to a concept similar to “collective punishment”:
a case wherein the hands of all members of a set are deemed unclean due to the iniquity of
just one of them.
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and not merely conditioned on it is made clear from the CHD’s doctrinal
and practical preoccupation with plaintiff iniquity and from the fact that
the judicial labor of deciding whether to apply the CHD almost entirely
turns on determining whether the plaintiff’s hands are unclean. As such,
the doctrine of the CHD exhibits the marks of a practice of punishment: it
is a wrongdoing that grounds any and all implementations of the defense,
which means that the CHD is conditioned on and applied for wrongdoing.
That the CHD is meted out for wrongdoing is further reflected in the
traditional formulation of the clean hands maxim: “he who comes into
equity must come with clean hands,”81 suggesting that those whose hands
are unclean in a sense deserve to lose access to equitable relief due to
their unclean hands, that is, their wrongdoing is a reason for the sanction.
Moreover, the choice of “unclean hands” as the doctrinal focal point, as
opposed to, for example, “conduct potentially deleterious to the integrity
of the court,” further suggests that there is a component of moral reaction
and disdain for wrongdoing built into the CHD.
I suspect that in arguing that the CHD is not a punitive doctrine, courts
are conflating description and justification, as if concerned that recognizing
the punitive aspects inherent in the doctrine of the CHD would somehow
negate the CHD’s presumed underlying goal as a protector of court integrity.
But justifying the CHD on the grounds of court integrity does not mandate
denying the doctrine’s punitive nature. The justifications for grounding
any and all implementations of the CHD in the plaintiff’s wrongdoing may
derive from a variety of values. For example, it is certainly possible (although,
as argued above, unlikely) that the CHD is a punitive doctrine that is justified
primarily on grounds of court integrity.82 And a justification grounded
primarily in court integrity does not necessarily negate the fact that the
doctrinal logic or structure of the CHD is punitive.
Once we have accepted that the CHD has the structure of a punitive
doctrine, the question of its retributive underpinnings arises. Norms of
retribution are inherent in practices of punishment:83 punishment is con-
ditioned on there being an (actual or apparent) wrong to sanction, and the
sanctioning with punishment is for or by reason of that wrong.84 This is the
essence of retributive justice: sanctioning a wrongdoer for her wrongdoing.
As just explained, there is reason to think that the best interpretation of
the CHD is as a doctrine grounded in this punitive logic. Thus the CHD
embodies a retributive norm.
81. Johnson, supra note 1.
82. I use “justified primarily” as opposed to “justified solely” because if norms of retribution
have some moral weight and are inherent in practices of punishment, then retribution is a
norm that necessarily plays some role in the justification of any punitive rule. For more on this
line of logic, see infra Section VIII.
83. See supra note 78.
84. In the paradigmatic case of punishment, punishing X is not merely conditioned on X’s
wrongdoing but is also meted out for that wrongdoing.
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B. Retributive Reasons for the Clean Hands Defense
Moving once again from the descriptive to the justificatory, assuming that
we accept that the CHD exhibits the logic or structure of a retributive
norm—punishing a wrongdoer for or by reason of her wrongdoing—the
question that arises is whether the (legal) sanction of the CHD is (morally)
justifiable, at least partially, on retributive grounds.
There is a variety of theories of retributivism accounting for why and
when punishing wrongdoing is just. One version of retributivism justifies
punishment simply on the grounds that wrongdoing makes wrongdoers
deserving of a sanction.85 A second prominent retributive approach views
punishment as rectification, standing for the position that punishment is
justified because it annuls, erases, or confiscates ill-gotten or unfair ad-
vantages from the wrongdoer.86 “Communicative retributivism” is another
modern strand of retributivism which justifies punishment as an expression
and denouncement of wrongdoing.87
Regrettably, it is beyond the scope of this article to give anything other
than a cursory demonstration of how each of these types of retributive
theories accounts for and assesses the retributive norm embodied in the
doctrine of the CHD. Yet, assuming retribution is just, on the face of things it
does appear that one could reasonably argue that, considering that plaintiffs
with unclean hands are by definition wrongdoers: (a) they deserve the
sanction of the CHD; (b) they gained an ill-gotten gain or advantage through
their previous wrongdoing that is annulled or confiscated through denying
them a remedy for a wrong related to the wrong that they inflicted on
others; and (c) in cases of unclean hands, condemnation of wrongdoing
is well communicated to the wrongdoer and others through denying the
wrongdoers access to a remedy for a related wrong they suffered.
Moreover, in retributive reasoning, punishment is just when it is fitting
and proportionate in relation to the wrong committed.88 Whether a partic-
ular sanction is retributively warranted depends on whether it is deserved,
effectively communicates condemnation, or successfully annuls an ill-gotten
85. See R.A. DUFF, PUNISHMENT, COMMUNICATION, AND COMMUNITY (2001), at 20–21; David
Wood, Punishment: Nonconsequentialism, 5 PHIL. COMPASS 470, 471 (2010); Michael S. Moore,
Justifying Retributivism, 27 ISR. L. REV., 15, 15–21 (1993).
86. See, e.g., GEORGE SHER, DESERT 69–90 (1987); DUFF, supra note 85, at 21–23; Michael
Davis, How toMake the Punishment Fit the Crime, 93 ETHICS 726 (1983); John Finnis, The Restoration
of Retribution, 32 ANALYSIS 131 (1972).
87. ANTHONY DUFF, TRIALS AND PUNISHMENT (1986), at 233–267; DUFF, supra note 85, at 27–
30; Jean Hampton, An Expressive Theory of Retribution, in RETRIBUTION AND ITS CRITIQUES 1–27
(Wesley Cragg ed., 1992). For a recently developed justification of legal punishment called
“confrontational retributivism” that is based on a communicative conception of retribution, see
Dan Markel, What Might Retributive Justice Be?, in RETRIBUTIVISM: ESSAYS ON THEORY AND POLICY
(Mark D. White ed., forthcoming).
88. On the retributive requirement that the punishment fit or be proportionate to the
wrong/crime, see, e.g., Hampton, supra note 87, at 13; Michael S. Moore, The Moral Worth of
Retribution, in RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER, AND THE EMOTIONS 179, 180 (Ferdinand Schoeman
ed., 1987); Davis, supra note 86, at 727.
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advantage. But if taken more loosely, the retributive requirement for a fit-
ting or appropriate punishment is nicely captured in the age-old retributive
maxim of lex talionis: that punishment should be in kind and no more,89 or
that “the punishment must fit the crime.” When taken literally, this is, of
course, an ideal not easily realized in the law. Accordingly, the days of “an
eye for an eye” are fortunately long gone. Nevertheless, one of the retribu-
tive virtues of the CHD is that unlike many doctrines of legal punishment,
it achieves a very neat fit in type between transgression and sanction: it is
fitting to deny a plaintiff a remedy for a wrong related to the wrong she
inflicted on others.90
This correlation in type between infraction and sanction is rare in the law,
which generally employs only fines and prison terms as sanctions for numer-
ous radically different types of wrongdoing. Denying the plaintiff-wrongdoer
relief assures that he receives—under lex talionis—what he deserves for his
prior wrongdoing: to suffer a wrong related to his own. The CHD punishes
in that it denies the plaintiff-wrongdoer the right to petition for legal relief
that would otherwise remedy or annul the harm that the petitioner in a
sense has coming to him. Of course, it is the defendant and not the court
that is the direct source of the fitting and deserved punishment/wrong. Yet
the CHD has the effect of denying the right to legal relief or nullification
of that wrong. The CHD’s role in assuring this elegant fit in type between
transgression and sanction gives further support to the position defended
in the previous section that the CHD embodies a retributive norm.
The CHD also captures the retributive tenet of proportionality that “the
punishment must fit the crime and no more” in the fact that when the
wrong the plaintiff has suffered (grounding her suit) outweighed in its
severity her past wrongdoing (constituting her unclean hands), courts have,
at times, chosen not to apply the CHD.91 This reflects the fact that when
the severity of the sanction nonnegligibly outweighs the severity of the
“crime,” the sanction is not retributively just and should not be imposed.
This proportionality measure is imperfect, and it is certainly possible that
while the CHD achieves a fit in type between sanction and wrong, it does
not always achieve perfect alignment in terms of the severity in the harms
caused by the sanction and the wrong. To this I assert that an overly stringent
proportionality requirement between the effects of the crime and those
of the sanction runs the risk of proving the improbable: that most legal
punishment also fails to count as retributive. After all, the suffering and
loss that a prison term or fine causes greatly varies from one defendant to
another, even when their wrongdoing and their punishment are identical.92
89. BLACK, supra note 2, at 932.
90. This is not to say that the sanction the CHD imposes necessarily exhausts the punish-
ment the plaintiff-wrongdoer deserves.
91. Supra note 15.
92. See, e.g., Adam J. Kolber, The Subjective Experience of Punishment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 182
(2009).
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Notice that the CHD potentially sanctions both plaintiff and defendant;
although the CHD assures that the defendant—a presumed wrongdoer
deserving of sanction in her own right—wins the case, were that defendant
to bring a suit against the plaintiff for his wrongdoing (which constituted
his unclean hands) she (the former defendant) would most likely also lose
on grounds of unclean hands. This is a function of the fact that the CHD
is generally available only where the plaintiff’s wrongdoing is somehow
mixed with the defendant’s relevant wrongdoing93 or is directed against
the defendant.94
The concept of redemption provides another reason to associate the
CHD with retribution. Courts have refused to apply the CHD against certain
plaintiffs guilty of wrongdoing on the grounds that those plaintiffs ceased
their wrongdoing or otherwise redeemed themselves.95 Redemption does
not transform the guilty into innocents, yet it does make the redeemed
party no longer deserving of punishment for the wrongdoing of which he
is guilty. Retributive norms comfortably accommodate the phenomenon of
redemption because they turn on the desert of the guilty and can account
for the category of a guilty wrongdoer who is nonetheless redeemed and
therefore not deserving of punishment. As suggested above, the doctrine
of the CHD appears to incorporate a similar logic.
The CHD is, however, an imperfect punitive doctrine. It usually succeeds
in punishing only those litigants who would have otherwise been successful
in obtaining the sought-after remedy. Litigants with “losing” or meritless
claims (irrespective of their unclean hands) whose claims end up rejected
on grounds of unclean hands would have lost their claim regardless.96
Thus, although the CHD has retributive logic, it is not always retributively
successful. Another possible proportionality problem with viewing the CHD
as a retributive doctrine derives from the fact that the CHD may allow for
rejecting the claim of a litigant already otherwise punished for her past
wrongdoing.97 I think this worry is overblown. One reason, beyond the
point that occasional imperfection in retribution is not, in and of itself, a
strong argument in this context, is to realize that the CHD generally applies
to conduct that is not otherwise legally penalized. Legal punishment—be
it criminal or in the form of punitive damages—does not come near to
covering the realm of moral, ethical, and even legal wrongdoing that the
CHD covers. Moreover, supplementing legal punishment with the sanction
of the CHD does not necessarily result in disproportionate penalizing, just
93. See supra note 6.
94. See DOBBS, supra note 1, at 70–71.
95. See, e.g., Stewart v. Jackson, 635 N.E.2d 186, 189–190 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (“Indiana
has recognized the ability to purge oneself of wrongdoing, which effectively restores the right
to equitable relief. . . . Because the Stewarts no longer [illegally] operate any businesses from
their home, they have purged themselves of unclean hands.”) (citations omitted); Estate of
Blanco, 86 Cal. App. 3d 826, 833 (1978).
96. In fact, the CHD may actually benefit such litigants in saving them litigation costs.
97. For this objection I am grateful to one of the referees for LEGAL THEORY.
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as differences between sentences for two similar crimes do not necessarily
lead to such a conclusion.
VI. PUBLIC POLICY
A complete account of what the CHD is normatively for must look beyond
the norms and values embodied in the structure of the doctrine of the CHD
and also capture the doctrine’s salient or significant normative implications
and effects. Above, when exploring the CHD in terms of court integrity, I
offer some speculations about the morally valuable effects that preserving
court integrity through the CHD may have on court legitimacy. Another way
the CHD may have favorable effects on court legitimacy is as a product of
imposing the tu quoque and giving wrongdoers their “just deserts,” maxims
people tend to associate with fairness and justice.
A further possibly favorable effect occasionally associated with the CHD
is the deterrence of wrongdoing.98 Presumably potential plaintiffs wishing
to preserve their access to equitable remedies would shy away from conduct
that might dirty their hands. The most likely scenario involves deterring
retaliatory wrongdoing: concerned with preserving their cause of action,
would-be plaintiffs would presumably turn immediately to the courts and
await their ruling, foregoing resorting to self-help or retaliation that involves
wrongdoing.
Justifying the CHD on the grounds of deterrence requires that people
actually know of and be motivated by the CHD and its sanction. I dare say
that the CHD and its detrimental implications for iniquitous plaintiffs are
not common knowledge and rarely guide conduct. Therefore the justifica-
tory scope and strength of the deterrence justification are probably limited
primarily to parties whose actions are subject to the advice of counsel, for
example, large corporations or parties already engaged in litigation.
The CHD may still, however, have wide-reaching effects on people’s con-
duct not through deterrence but rather more vicariously. While not all
actors know of the CHD or even of its implications, some clearly do. Those
who are aware of the CHD are often sophisticated actors (such as lawyers,
government bodies, corporations, legal aid agencies, legal Internet sites)
possessing the power to influence and regulate the conduct of others. The
practices, procedures, and standards followed and instituted by members
of this smaller, more sophisticated group—who are directly aware of and are
deterred by the CHD—may affect and mold the practices of many others,
causing them to adhere to the goals of the CHD without their awareness.
An additional public-interest consideration in favor of the CHD is the
protection it offers to the efficiency and reliability of the judicial process.
The concerns here are primarily evidentiary. In some jurisdictions the CHD
98. FISCHER, supra note 9, at 462–463. See, e.g., Farino v. Farino, 450 N.Y.S.2d 593, 594 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2d Dep’t. 1982).
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also applies to litigants who dirtied their hands in an attempt to subvert the
equitable judicial process to which they are a party.99 Such is the case of,
for example, a litigant who lies or misrepresents facts to the court. In order
to deter such guile and to preserve the reliability of the judicial process,
untruthful litigants are often ejected from the litigation on the grounds of
their unclean hands.100
These evidentiary considerations strongly apply to courts presiding over
issues of equity. Such courts do not always have the luxury of hearing tes-
timony and at times must rely on affidavits alone, especially when called
to rule on provisional equitable relief.101 When lacking the adversary safe-
guards built into the evidentiary process, courts sitting in equity are at times
more vulnerable to deceit and more dependent on the litigants’ honesty
and reliability. These concerns are increased where proceedings are held
ex parte, as they sometimes are.102 Understandably wary of relying on facts
offered by plaintiffs who have demonstrated a propensity toward subverting
the judicial process, courts are wise to turn to the protections of the CHD.
VII. THE NORMATIVITY OF THE CLEAN HANDS DEFENSE,
OR WHAT THE CLEAN HANDS DEFENSE IS FOR
A. Method
Giving a normative theory to the CHD entails accounting for its “normative
universe” or for what it is normatively for or about. Capturing the doctrine’s
normative structure is the first step. The term “normative structure” refers
to the norms and values that the standards and rules of a legal doctrine
constitute, embody, or are legal manifestations of, as well as to the logical
relations between those norms and values.103 Yet a theory of a legal doc-
trine’s normative structure does not, in and of itself, offer an exhaustive
account of the doctrine’s normative universe or of what the doctrine is nor-
matively for. An account of the normatively significant or salient effects of
the CHD is also required. Moreover, given an account of the various norms
and values relevant to the CHD—that is, of its normative universe—the
question then becomes: What do those norms and values have going for
them from a moral point of view?
99. One such example is the Israeli legal system. See, e.g., Nibit Systems, Inc. v. State of
Israel—Ministry of Commerce and Industry, HCJ 579/89 1; Balles v. Dist. Attorney of Tel Aviv,
HCJ 742/86 1.
100. Id.
101. DOBBS, supra note 1, at 184.
102. For example, where there are exigent circumstances, a litigant may pursue a temporary
restraining order without providing the defendant with prior notice. FED. R. CIV. P. 65(b)
(2010).
103. See supra note 30.
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B. The Normative Structure of the Clean Hands Defense
We first consider above the role of court integrity, concluding that unlike
what most courts appear to believe, court integrity is not a value fully aligned
with or embodied in the CHD. In fact, there is some reason to think that the
CHD actually sets back elements of court integrity to an extent. Therefore,
although the CHD may often further court integrity (on balance), the
norms the CHD comprises do not count a norm of court integrity among
their ranks. The tu quoque, on the other hand, is a norm that the CHD does
embody. As shown above, the normative structure of the CHD is of a legal
manifestation of the tu quoque, embodying a normative construct according
to which blaming, claiming, or complaining that involves hypocrisy fails
on illocutionary grounds. Retribution, too, is a norm that is part of the
CHD’s normative structure, which is a doctrine centered on sanctioning
wrongdoers for or by reason of their wrongdoing. As essential parts of
its normative structure, both retribution and the tu quoque are inherently
manifested in any proper application of the CHD. They are, in other words,
part of what the CHD is.
Whether a norm turning on considerations of public interest is also part
of the CHD’s normative structure is more of a puzzle. As explained above,
where there are reasons of public interest against applying the CHD that
outweigh the severity or egregiousness of the plaintiff’s prior wrongful con-
duct, courts may and on occasion have ruled against applying the CHD, even
where a plaintiff’s hands are undoubtedly unclean.104 Whether this rule is
part of the CHD’s doctrine or external to it is a matter of interpretation. I
tend not to view this public-interest rule as part of the CHD but more as a
general principle of equitable reasoning. It seems to me that a counterfac-
tual legal system containing a doctrine with all the elements of the CHD, but
for the rule that public interest may override the defense, would still have a
CHD doctrine. Thus the public-interest rule is not essential to the logic or
normative structure of the CHD but appears more like an external standard
that cuts against the logic of the CHD. In any case, had this public-interest
rule been part of the doctrine of the CHD, the normative structure of the
CHD would have comprised a public-interest side-constraint on the CHD’s
public-policy goals and on its norms of retribution and tu quoque.
C. What Norms and Values the Clean Hands Defense Is for
and What They Have “Going for Them”
A theory of what a legal doctrine is normatively for must account for all
the doctrine’s salient and significant normative aspects, effects, and im-
plications. One must draw a line between a doctrine’s salient and signifi-
cant normative results, implications, or effects and those more removed or
104. Supra note 15.
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negligible. This line is, of course, as fuzzy—turning on concepts such as
“salient,” “significant,” and “immediate”—as it is dynamic—dependent on
changes in the law and the factual circumstances. As such, some of the
functional aspects of a doctrine’s normativity are potentially in flux.
Throughout the article I am identifying the CHD’s salient normative
virtues. To recap: they include furthering court integrity as it relates to
judge integrity, court legitimacy, and the well-being of individual citizens
and members of the legal community attached to the court system, as well
as embodying the legal norms of the tu quoque and retribution found in the
CHD, to the extent that they, too, contribute to the public’s positive image
of the court and its legitimacy. The CHD’s contribution to the efficiency
and reliability of the judicial process is another important positive aspect of
the CHD’s normativity, as is the occasional deterrence of wrongdoing.
How may we account for the normative value of the legal norms of tu
quoque and retribution found in the CHD in relation to the presumed moral
norms of tu quoque and retribution? Assuming the norms of tu quoque and
retribution are moral and that they indeed prescribe denying standing to
plaintiffs with unclean hands, it follows that their legal counterparts—the
legal norms of tu quoque and retribution embodied in the CHD—derive
certain moral value from carrying out the prescriptions of the moral norms
of tu quoque and retribution.
All these positive normative implications of the CHD comprise its norma-
tive universe and the answer to the question: What is the CHD normatively
for?
VIII. THOUGHTS ON TYING TOGETHER THE THREADS
OF JUSTIFICATION
For each potential norm or value considered throughout the article as a can-
didate for counting as a salient normative aspect of the CHD, I am offering
both a structural as well as a brief moral assessment. Upon identifying what
the CHD has going for it from a moral point of view—namely manifesting
the tu quoque and retribution, various public-policy benefits, and favorable
effects on individuals’ well-being—one wonders how all these factor into a
justification of the CHD.
Accounting for a legal doctrine’s normative universe or what it is norma-
tively for or about is a descriptive or interpretive endeavor, yet it cannot
help also having a justificatory component. In giving a normative account
of something, we are, by the very nature of the practice, engaged in a justifi-
catory project.105 This is because norms and values are reasons for actions,
and therefore, even if given for purposes of description, they cannot but
also be justificatory. Thus, to the extent that the norms and values (and
105. John Gardner, What Is Tort Law For? 1, The Place of Corrective Justice, 30 LAW & PHIL. 1, 3
(2011).
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their interrelations) of the CHD are of moral weight, and as argued above,
at least some obviously are, they necessarily play some role in the CHD’s
justification.
Yet accounting for the prescriptive aspects of the descriptive account of
the CHD’s normativity—as I do in identifying what the doctrine’s norms
and values “have going for them”—does not deliver a full account of the
CHD’s justification. A justificatory project (resulting in a neutral, positive, or
negative prescription) of a legal doctrine is also a function of considerations
that go beyond what the doctrine is normatively for. Normative descriptions
of what a legal doctrine is for or about yield at best reasons for and against
the doctrine and perhaps, in conjunction, also a prima facie justification
for the doctrine, but certainly not an all-things-considered justification (to
the extent that an all-things-considered justification is possible).
One thing that justification, even only a prima facie one, would obvi-
ously require is figuring out the moral weight of each of the various moral
virtues I am associating with the CHD throughout the analysis. The game of
justification requires not only identifying the relevant players—that is, the
doctrine’s morally significant structural aspects and effects—but also deter-
mining the allocation of the justificatory labor among them. It is possible,
for example, that the moral weight or significance of the moral norms of
tu quoque or retribution is relatively low and that the main force behind a
justification for the legal norms of tu quoque and retribution that the CHD
embodies derives from the doctrine’s role in furthering values other than tu
quoque or retribution, such as deterrence, judicial efficiency, or court legiti-
macy. Contradictions between the justificatory threads are also not beyond
the realm of possibility.
Further, moral considerations not part of the CHD’s normative universe
may certainly also play roles in the doctrine’s justification. For one, there are
often cost and benefit implications. For example, perhaps the positive effects
of the CHD are more efficiently achievable through a different doctrine of
law, so while the CHD may have much going for it, there may still be a
better alternative. Moreover, considering the administrative and other costs
of imposing and adjudicating legal rules, perhaps there are other, more
pressing values that the legal system should direct its limited resources
toward, the virtues of the CHD not withstanding. Yet another concern may
derive from the legal system’s interest in its overall simplicity, coherence, and
efficacy. Perhaps, for example, while favorable when considered on its own,
the CHD may not fit well within the broader context of legal doctrines,
standards, and rules. As the law changes, for instance, certain doctrines
may lose their relevancy, position, or usefulness within the broader legal
system.
To the extent that they are possible, all-things-considered justifications
are, in other words, a tall order. For the purposes of giving a normative
theory of the CHD, it will suffice to identify the normative universe of the
CHD, the norms and values it comprises, what those norms and values have
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morally going for them, and the fact that they appear to amount to a prima
facie justification of the CHD.
IX. CONCLUSION
I set out to develop a normative theory of the clean hands defense. I first ar-
gued that the standard judicial account of the normative nature of the CHD
is wrong. This does not entail that courts are always mistaken in associating
the CHD with the furthering of court integrity, but there are strong reasons
to believe that the CHD neither fully embodies nor is fully aligned with a
norm of court integrity. The better view of the CHD’s normative nature is
to see it as a doctrine of standing and as a legal manifestation of the norms
of tu quoque and retribution. Occasionally court integrity does play a role in
the CHD’s normativity, yet it is a functional and not a structural role.
Turning to the prescriptive and to reflecting on justification, there are
several moral virtues in the CHD. These include the occasional furthering
of judge integrity, the well-being of individuals attached to the court system,
court legitimacy, deterrence, and the reliability of the judicial process. In
addition, assuming that the norms embodied in the CHD—the tu quoque
and retribution—are of moral value, furthering such norms through the
law adds additional justificatory force to the CHD. Taken together these
various moral virtues the CHD has going for it amount to a prima facie
justification for the defense.
